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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

RHANEY v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND EASTERN SHORE:
A LANDLORD DOES NOT OWE HIS TENANT A DUTY TO
CONTROL THE TORTIOUS ACTS OF A THIRD PERSON
PROVIDED THE ACTS ARE NOT FORESEEABLE
By: Jennifer Lewandowski
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a landlord does not
owe his tenant a duty to control the tortious acts of a third person
provided that the acts are not foreseeable. Rhaney v. Univ. of Md. E.
Shore, 388 Md. 585, 880 A.2d 357 (2005). Specifically, a duty does
not extend to the harm inflicted by a third party whose presence cannot
reasonably be considered a "dangerous condition," but is instead, an
unforeseeable danger. Jd. at 599, 880 A.2d at 365. The Court of
Appeals also clarified that a student is not a business invitee within the
confines of a dormitory. Jd. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364.
On October 29, 1998, Anthony F. Rhaney, Jr. ("Rhaney") and
Ennis Clark ("Clark"), roommates and students enrolled at the
University of Maryland Eastern Shore ("UMES"), engaged in an
argument in the confines of their dormitory room. The argument
consisted of Clark alleging that Rhaney had cracked his fish tank.
Clark punched Rhaney in the jaw after Rhaney denied cracking the
tank.
Clark was involved in two prior altercations resulting in one
disciplinary action, his suspension from school. Clark's return to
UMES was contingent upon his participation and completion of
professional conflict resolution counseling, which he satisfied through
a Save Our Streets program. UMES did not reveal Clark's previous
violent incidents to Rhaney prior to placing them as roommates.
However, Rhaney learned of Clark's previous incidents prior to their
dispute.
Rhaney filed a complaint against UMES alleging that UMES was
negligent in failing to disclose Clark's dangerous propensities, an
. assault was foreseeable, and UMES breached its duty of care to
Rhaney as an invitee. The Circuit Court for Somerset County sent the
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case to trial after denying UMES's motion for summary judgment.
The jury returned a verdict against UMES.
UMES appealed in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which reversed the circuit court's judgment stating that the evidence
was insufficient to establish that Clark's assault on his roommate was
foreseeable. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Rhaney's
petition for certiorari to determine whether an incorrect restrictive
standard of foreseeability was applied and whether an improper
addition to the law of premises liability was made regarding policy on
college admission and disciplinary procedures.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by stating the
elements of negligence as derived in Muthukumarana v. Montgomery
County, 370 Md. 447, 486, 805 A.2d 372, 395 (2002), which include
duty, breach of that duty, an actual injury sustained, and the injury
proximately resulted from a breach of that duty. Rhaney, 388 Md. at
596, 880 A.2d at 363-64. The plaintiffs burden is to establish that a
duty was breached and that the breach proximately caused the injuries.
!d. at 596-97, 880 A.2d at 364.
If it was established that no duty existed, then there can be no
liability against the defendant. !d. at 597, 880 A.2d at 364. The Court
of Appeals stated in Horridge v. St. Mary's County Dep 't of Social
Servs., 382 Md. 170, 183, 854 A.2d 1232, 1239 (2004), that there is no
duty to prevent a third person from causing harm to another person,
outside of a special relationship. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 597, 880 A.2d at
364. The Court specifically found that UMES had a landlord/tenant
relationship with Rhaney because of the "Residence Hall Agreement"
that governed the dormitory room where this incident occurred. !d. at
602, 880 A.2d at 367. The premise adopted in Crown Cork & Seal
Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 156-59, 131 A.2d 470, 472-75 (1957), is
that a person's legal status is generally controlled by that person's
status on the land at the time of the incident. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 602,
880 A.2d at 367. The Court distinguished that Rhaney's status may
have been as a business invitee anywhere else on UMES's campus.
!d. However, the landlord/tenant relationship established UMES's
standard of care regarding Rhaney's battery by Clark. !d.
A landlord has a duty of reasonable care for known or reasonably
foreseeable risks to a tenant. !d. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364. In
Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 537, 826
A.2d 443, 452 (2003), the Court established "the general principal that
a landlord 'has no obligation to maintain the leased premises for the
safety of the tenant."' Rhaney, 388 Md. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364. The
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Court of Appeals found that, occasionally, a duty towards a tenant
arises because of a dangerous condition in common areas that the
landlord controls. !d. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364-65. To be liable, the
landlord must have actual knowledge of an activity that may affect this
condition or should have had knowledge and foreseen the sustained
injury. Id. at 598, 880 A.2d at 365. The Court also reiterated the need
established by Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554
(1976), to avoid "making a landlord the insurer of its tenant's safety."
Rhaney, 388 Md. at 598, 880 A.2d at 365.
Next, Rhaney unsuccessfully argued that UMES owed him an
affirmative duty under a business owner/invitee relationship. /d. at
590, 880 A.2d at 359-60. The plaintiff argued that under Southland
Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 715-16, 633 A.2d 84, 89 (1993), an
affirmative duty exists for a business owner to use reasonable and
ordinary care in order to keep his premises safe for the purpose of
protecting an invitee from injury caused by an unreasonable risk that
the invitee would not discover on his or her own by exercising
ordinary care. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 601, 880 A.2d 366-67.
The Court of Appeals discounted Rhaney as a business invitee of
UMES because of the explicit terms in the "Residence Hall
Agreement," which stated that within the dormitory his status was that
of a tenant and UMES's status was a landlord. !d. at 602, 880 A.2d at
367. The Court of Appeals further held that even if Rhaney did have
this business owner/invitee relationship with UMES, he would not
succeed in litigation because of insufficient evidence, his personal
knowledge of Clark's prior incident, and his own inaction of finding a
new roommate. /d. at 603, 880 A.2d 367-68.
Further, based on previous decisions by the Court of Appeals,
UMES would be liable if Clark's presence constituted a "dangerous
condition" and the harm that Rhaney suffered was a result ofUMES's
actual knowledge of Clark's violent tendencies toward his future
roommate. !d. at 599, 880 A.2d at 365. Hemmings and Scott
demonstrated that physical dangers or conditions that contributed to
criminal activity on the premises constituted "dangerous conditions."
Id. at 599, 880 A.2d at 365. Scott held that a landlord maintains a duty
of reasonable care if the landlord possessed knowledge of such
conditions. !d. The Court of Appeals held that neither of those cases
implied that the actual criminal act that occurred constituted a
"dangerous condition." Id. at 599-600, 880 A.2d at 365. In Scott the
Court further held that a landlord only has a duty to "take reasonable
measures" in eliminating conditions that contribute to criminal
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activity. !d. The Court of Appeals held that Clark cannot be
considered a "dangerous condition." !d. at 600, 880 A.2d at 366.
Furthermore, even if Clark amounted to a "dangerous condition,"
UMES would not be liable because it still did not have actual
knowledge that Clark would batter Rhaney. !d.
The Court of Appeals determined that one disciplinary action
against Clark was insufficient for UMES to foresee or have knowledge
Clark was more than a one-time offender of the UMES disciplinary
system. !d. at 600-01, 880 A.2d at 366. Comparisons made between
Hemmings police records of multiple crimes in an area and Scott
noting 72 total crimes in the vicinity indicated that one incident by
Clark remained insufficient for UMES to have had knowledge of a
foreseeable harm being inflicted upon Rhaney. !d. at 601, 880 A.2d at
366.
Comparing the present case to past precedent, the Court of Appeals
communicated an idea that only existed prior to this case through
inference. The Court succinctly compiled the negligence standards for
premise liability for both landlord/tenant and business owner/invitee
relationships. A general rule of no duty against tortious acts of third
persons that are not foreseeable was likely adopted in previous
opinions, but has been expressly accepted in Rhaney v. University of
Maryland Eastern Shore.

